Michigan Law Review
Volume 42

Issue 1

1943

TAXATION - SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS - DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE FOR REPAIR OF EXISTING
IMPROVEMENT
Hobart Taylor, Jr.
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Taxation-State and Local Commons

Recommended Citation
Hobart Taylor, Jr., TAXATION - SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS - DUE PROCESS - REQUIREMENT OF NOTICE FOR
REPAIR OF EXISTING IMPROVEMENT, 42 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1943).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol42/iss1/17

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1 943}

RECENT DECISIONS

177

TAXATION - SPECIAL AssESSMENTs - DuE PRocEss - REQUIREMENT
OF NOTICE FOR REPAIR OF EXISTING IMPROVEMENT-Plaintiff brought this
action against the Board of Commissioners of Wells County, Indiana, to quiet his
title to 160 acres of land owned by him in the county and to enjoin enforcement
of supplementary drainage assessments upon the property as permitted by Indiana
law. Plaintiff contended that the statute 1 creating drainage districts was violative of due process of law and unconstitutional in that it authorized supplementary assessments to be made by the Board of Commissioners without the
same notice and hearing which was required before the original assessment could
be made. On demurrer, the Wells Circuit Court held for plaintiff and defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana. Held, due process of law
does not require that notice and a hearing be given property owners to validate
additional assessments made against their property when such additional assessments are made in accordance with the original valuation of accrued benefit to
their lands. Board of Commissioners of Wells County v. Falk, (Ind. 1943)

47 N. E. (2d) 320.
In the absence of action which is clearly arbitrary or capricious, a state, in
the exercise of the general power of taxation 2 and consistently with due process

lnd. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), § 27-210.
"The power of the legislature in matters of taxation is unlimited except as restricted by the constitution. The legislature,· in the exercise of this power in making
local improvements, may create a special taxing district without regard to the boundaries
of counties, townships or municipalities. • .• It is clear, therefore, that the special tax
to be paid under said law is an assessment of benefits to the persons and property taxed
by the legislature in the exercise of its sovereign power of taxation." Board of Commissioners v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500 at 504-505, 507, 46 N. E. 124 (18<}7). It is
frequently said that the power of assessment, though springing from the general power
of taxation, is greatly different from the general power of taxation in that taxes are
levied for general revenue purposes whereas assessments are authorized solely for the
benefit of the property on which they are imposed. See cases cited 28 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1124 at 1133 (1910).
1

2
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of law, may by direct action of the legislature, impose special assessments without notice or hearing upon property benefited by the levy, and the legislative
finding of the necessity of the improvement and of benefit to the lands affected
will be conclusive and not subject to review by the courts.3 Quite frequently,
however, the legislature delegates to an administrative body the power to authorize improvements and to assess the costs against property in proportion to
the benefits received. Where the assessment is imposed by such an administrative
board acting pursuant to delegated authority, and there has been no determination by the legislature .that the assessed property will be specially benefited, due
process of law requires that notice and an opportunity to be heard be given the
property owner at some time before the tax becomes irrevocably fixed and
binding. 4 If, after a proper original assessment, additional levies are made for
repairs and improvements to the project, the courts have generally held that
neither notice nor hearing is required with respect to the supplementary proceeding, regardless of whether the levy is made to keep the existing improvement in proper repair 5 or to pay the cost of work not originally contemplated. 6
3 "And where, within the scope of its power, the legislature itself has found that
the lands included in the district will be specifically benefited by the improvements,
prior appropriate and adequate inquiry is presumed, and the finding is conclusive."
Chesebro v. Los Angeles County Flood Control District, 306 U. S. 459 at 464, 59
S. Ct. 6 2 2 ( l 9 39) . If no express findings are made by the legislature, a finding of
benefit may be implied from the execution of the taxing power. Id. And a determination of a municipality upon the questions of the necessity of the improvement and of
the benefit to the assessed property are as conclusive as if made by the legislature itself.
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 at 379, 28 S. Ct. 708 (1907); Hancock v. City of
Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454 at 458, '39 S. Ct. 528 (1919); Withnell v. Ruecking Construction Co., 249 U. S. 63, 39 S. Ct. 200 (1919). And, of course, if a tax such as a
poll tax or an excise tax is imposed without regard to the valuation of property, notice
and hearing is not required. Hagar v. Reclamation District, l II U. S. 701, 4 S. Ct.
663 (1884).
4 Londoner v. Denver, 2m U.S. 373, 28 S. Ct. 708 (1908); Fallbrook Irrigation
District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. II2, 17 S. Ct. 56 (1896); Central of Georgia R.R. v.
Wright, 207 U. S. 127, 28 S. Ct. 47 (1907). And see 37 MrcH, L. REv. 1311
- ( 193 9). As to notice and hearing generally in administrative proceedings, see 34 CoL.
L. REv. 332 (1934); So UNiv. PA. L. REv. 96 (1931); 89 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 808
(1941).
'
5 The reason generally given is that repair was contemplated at the time of the
original construction, and the parties having been notified of it are continued in court
and bound by the supplementary proceedings. Breiholtz v. Board of Supervisors of
Pocahontas County, 257 U.S. 118, 42 S. Ct. 13 (1921), affirming 186 Iowa 1147,
173 N. W. l (1919); Yeomans v. Riddle, 84 Iowa 147, 50 N. W. 886 (1891); McMillan v. Freeborn County, 93 Minn. 16, 100 N. W. 384 (1904); Board of Supervisors of Pottawattamie County v. Board of Supervisors of Harrison County, 214 Iowa
655, 24'1 N. W. 14 (19;2), appeal dismissed 290 U. S. 595, 54 S. Ct. 125 (1923).
See cases cited 84 A. L. R. 1098 ~t l 103 ( 193 3). Cf. Harmon v. Bolley, l 87 Ind.
5II, 120 N. E. 33 (1918).
6 People ex rel. Barber v. Chapman, 127 Ill. 387, 19 N. E. 872 (1889); Rouch
v. Himmelberger, 305 Mo. 70, 264 S. W. 658 (1924); Plummer v. Pitt, 167 Iowa
632, 149 N. W. 878 (1914); Elkins v. Millard County Drainage District, 77 Utah
303,294 P. 307 (1930); cases cited 84 A. L. R. 1098 at 1104 (1933).
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But if the cost of repairs is assessed solely against an individual property owner
because of alleged negligence on his part, he is entitled to notice and hearing on
the question of negligence and the extent of damages. 7 And the repairs contemplated may be so extensive and extraordinary as to constitute a new construction which will require further notice and hearing if the assessment is imposed by a body other than the legislature. 8 Because of the holding of the Indiana
court in Harmon v. Bolley,9 it was sometimes supposed that the general rule was
not followed in Indiana, and that it was necessary to give notice and hearing to
Indiana property owners before additional assessments could• be imposed consistent with due process of law.10 However the decision in the principal case is
cle~rly in support of the general rule 11 and removes any uncertainty with respect
to this branch of Indiana law.

Hobart Taylor, fr.

7 Kimball v. Board of Supervisors of Polk County, 190 Iowa 783, 180 N. W. 988
(1921).
8 State v. McGuire, 109 Minn. 88, 122 N. W. l 120 (1909); Breiholtz v. Board
of Supervisors of Pocahontas County, 257 U.S. II8, 42 S. Ct. 13 (1921).
9 187 Ind. 511, 120 N. E. 33 (1918). In this case, the original assessment was
not made proportionate to the benefits received, the statutory method being unreasonable on the peculiar facts of the case. The decision could have been justified on that
grounds. l 87 Ind. 5 l l at 540.
10 See comment, 84 A. L. R. 1098 at l 104 (1933).
11 In the principal case, the court said: "While it may be true that the result
reached in Harmon v. Bolley [ l 8 7 Ind. 5 II, l 20 N. E. 33 ( l 9 l 8) ] may be correct
upon the facts of that particular case, yet we can see no reason for applying its reasoning
to a case like the instant one where the appellee does not question the necessity for
drain repairs, the legality of the original proceeding for the construction of the drain,
or the fairness of the levying of the charges according to the rule used in the original
proceeding. In so far as the case of Harmon v. Bollcy, supra, is inconsistent with this
opinion, it is overruled." 47 N. E. (2d) 320 at 324.

